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Abstract 
Takano and Osaka’s (1997, 1999) careful review of empirical research on individualism and 
collectivism in the US and Japan revealed a striking lack of support for the “common view” that 
Japanese individuals are typical collectivists whereas Americans are typical individualists. Two 
decades on, Takano and Osaka (2018) conclude that empirical studies have continued to fail to 
support the common view—and yet this view is stubbornly persistent in the literature. More is at 
stake here than the characterization of two national cultures. The common view epitomizes a widely 
adopted binary view of culture, which reduces the richness and complexity of global cultural 
diversity to an oversimplified contrast between individualist/independent/Western/North American 
and collectivist/interdependent/Eastern/East Asian categories. Unless cultural psychologists can 
move beyond binary thinking and research practices, correcting an inaccurate portrayal of American 
and Japanese cultures will be of limited benefit. Future progress might be fostered by (a) defining 
concepts more precisely, (b) more use of exploratory approaches, (c) wider sampling of cultural 
groups and contexts, (d) using available methodological guidance for cross-cultural research, and (e) 
expanding research into cultural identities and stereotypes. 
 
 
  
Commentary on Takano and Osaka (2018):  
The “Common View” and the “Cultural Binary”—And How to Move Forward 
In the late 20th century, social psychologists developed a sudden interest in culture, fueled by 
research findings showing that East Asian research participants sometimes did not think, feel, or act 
in the same way as North Americans (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1997; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & 
Norasakkunkit, 1997; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). A common explanation for these findings 
was that “Western” nations—exemplified by the USA—had a cultural emphasis on individualism (or 
independence), whereas “Eastern” (or even all “non-Western”) nations—exemplified by Japan—had 
a cultural emphasis on collectivism (or interdependence) (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1993). 
Thus, culture was reconceptualized as a quasi-experimental variable that could be incorporated into 
standard social psychological research designs by comparing participants from a “Western” nation 
(e.g., USA) with participants from a “non-Western” nation (e.g., Japan). 
It was in this context that Takano and Osaka (1997, 1999) published their first review of 
individualism and collectivism in the USA and Japan. They carefully documented that there was 
surprisingly little evidence for the “common view” that US participants would show greater 
individualism whereas Japanese participants would show greater collectivism; findings were similar 
when using self-report or behavioral indicators of individualism and collectivism. I can still remember 
my excitement, as a young researcher skeptical of what I was reading about individualism and 
collectivism in the North American literature, when I first heard about the 1997 paper, unfortunately 
published in a language that I could not read, and then very fortunately discovered the 1999 English 
translation. In terms of the quasi-experimental approach to cultural psychology, Takano and Osaka’s 
review seemed to indicate a catastrophic failure of the “manipulation check”.  
However, Takano and Osaka’s (1997, 1999) review did not slow the quasi-experimental 
approach. Nor did two subsequent meta-analyses of cross-cultural variation in self-report measures 
of individualism-collectivism (I-C) and the related constructs of independent and interdependent 
self-construals (Levine et al., 2003; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). In their updated 
review, Takano and Osaka (2018) conclude that two more decades of research have not supported 
the common view. Refuting several alternative explanations for this lack of support, their conclusion 
is not restricted to studies that relied on self-reports, nor to those that relied on student samples.  
Why, then, is the common view so stubbornly persistent? Takano and Osaka (1999) proposed 
that the common view originated in biased information processing—especially the fundamental 
attribution error, whereby historical instances of collectivist behavior by Japanese people were 
wrongly attributed by culturally dominant Western observers to national character, rather than to 
situations of external threat to Japanese society—which would be expected to trigger pressures 
towards conformity (see Gelfand et al., 2011). They proposed that these initial misattributions led to 
the formation of a stereotype of the Japanese as collectivist, reinforced by cognitive mechanisms 
such as the out-group homogeneity effect and the confirmation bias. Echoed by some Japanese 
commentators, the common view then became a self-stereotype among the Japanese people. This 
historical account helps to explain why Japanese people have come to be seen as collectivists, but it 
says nothing about why Americans have come to be seen as individualists. Nor does it explain why 
the common view is so widespread and persistent—seemingly immune from empirical refutation—
in mainstream contemporary social psychology. One might expect social psychologists to be engaged 
in questioning cultural stereotypes, rather than propagating them. 
I believe that much more is at stake here than the cultural characterization of two of the 
world’s 200+ nations. I suspect that social psychologists may be unwilling to question the common 
view, in part because this view is closely tied to certain deeply held, but highly problematic, core 
assumptions within our discipline. Moreover, certain research practices make it easier to attend to 
evidence for, while dismissing evidence against, the common view. In my commentary, I will outline 
these assumptions and practices and consider how we might improve upon them.  
The “common view” and the “cultural binary” 
Added to the attribution and stereotyping processes highlighted by Takano and Osaka (1999), 
I believe that social psychologists are highly invested in the common view because it is seen as the 
prototypical illustration of a binary view of culture, which has shaped social psychological thinking 
about culture for more than 25 years. The “cultural binary” is an oversimplified contrast between 
individualist/independent/Western/North American and collectivist/interdependent/Eastern/East 
Asian cultures (Vignoles et al., 2016). To understand its origins and appeal, one should recognize that 
social psychology, like any other body of scientific thought, is constructed in part through social 
processes that do not happen in a cultural vacuum (Holton, 1973; Moscovici, 1993).  
Human language and thinking are commonly structured around semantic contrasts or binary 
oppositions (Derrida, 1982; Moscovici & Vignaux, 2000; Osgood, 1952; Saussure, 1959). Early in their 
development, children learn about “opposites”: that “black” is the opposite of “white”, “down” is 
the opposite of “up”, “bad” is the opposite of “good”, and so on (Murphy & Jones, 2008). Depending 
on their cultural context, children might also learn that “animal” is the opposite of “human”, “social” 
is the opposite of “individual”, “women” are the opposite of “men”, or that “East” is the opposite of 
“West”. Binary oppositions such as these have been described as themata: shared, and usually 
taken-for-granted, conceptual foundations upon which cultural groups build their representations of 
reality (Moscovici & Vignaux, 2000). Themata may become interrelated in cultural discourse: for 
example, in a given cultural context, women might be portrayed as more “animal” and men as more 
“human”, or black people as “bad” and white people as “good” (e.g., Renninger & Williams, 1966; 
Rudman & Mescher, 2012). Social theorists have often advocated identifying, questioning, and 
ultimately deconstructing the binary oppositions underlying everyday social discourse and thinking 
(e.g., Derrida, 1982). Deconstructing binaries potentially liberates people to propose and adopt 
alternative constructions of reality—by deconstructing the “animal/human” dichotomy, we can 
recognize our many similarities to other animals without this making us less human; by 
deconstructing the “masculine vs. feminine” dichotomy, we can embody masculinities or 
femininities that do not have to be defined in opposition to each other. 
Social psychologists have sometimes contributed to deconstructing binary oppositions (e.g., 
Bem, 1974; Kessler, 1998), but our thinking is not immune from cultural assumptions. A binary 
opposition that seemingly underlies much thinking in psychology is the idea that “social” is the 
opposite of “individual”. For over 100 years, scholars across disciplines have identified and 
questioned this cultural assumption, pointing out that individuality and sociality—far from being 
opposites—are both indispensable and mutually reinforcing aspects of human functioning (Green & 
Werner, 1996; Guisinger & Blatt, 1994; Kağıtçıbaşı, 2005; MacDougall, 1912; Marková, 1997; Spiro, 
1993; Taylor, 1991; Vignoles, in press; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2004). Yet 
contemporary psychological theorizing appears to reflect an “individual vs. social” binary opposition 
when it separates “nature” from “nurture” (Plomin, 1990), “agency” from “communion” (Abele & 
Wojciszke, 2007), “personal identity” from “social identity” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), “independent” 
from “interdependent self-construals” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), “differentiation” from 
“assimilation” (Brewer, 1991), “individualism” from “collectivism” (Triandis, 1993), and even 
“personality psychology” from “social psychology” (Deaux & Snyder, 2012).  
One unfortunate consequence of building theory on cultural assumptions is that the meanings 
of one’s concepts may seem to be self-evident or “natural”—and therefore not needing careful or 
precise definitions. Such is the case, I believe, with individualism and collectivism. Admittedly, many 
authors have offered formal definitions of individualism and collectivism (e.g., Brewer & Chen, 1997; 
Hofstede, 2001; Takano & Osaka, 1999; Triandis, 1993), but researchers and students implicitly 
“already know” what these terms mean, because of their resonance with the taken-for-granted 
“individual vs. social” opposition. As a result, the concepts of individualism and collectivism are often 
used extremely loosely: individualism potentially encompasses anything that is thought to reflect 
human individuality, and collectivism potentially encompasses anything that is thought to reflect 
human sociality. As a consequence, crucial questions about how individuality is accomplished in a 
collectivist society and how social cohesion is accomplished in an individualist society are not given 
sufficient attention (Durkheim, 1898/1969; Spiro, 1993; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000). 
The perceived ‘naturalness’ of the opposition between individualism and collectivism is 
reinforced by its confounding with another taken-for-granted binary opposition—the popular 
distinction between so-called “Western” and “Eastern” nations. Equating individualism with “The 
West” and collectivism with “The East”, together with the quasi-experimental approach to studying 
culture, transforms I-C from an abstract dimension (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Minkov, 2018) into a 
concrete typology with just two categories: Western individualism and Eastern collectivism. Cultural 
groups that are neither “Western” nor “Eastern”—including those residing in South America, Africa, 
the Middle East, West Asia, and Eastern Europe—may be either misrepresented or marginalized 
entirely from the scientific discourse. Thus, the kaleidoscopic richness of global cultural variation is 
reduced to a monolithic “cultural binary”, exemplified by the “common view” of Americans as 
individualistic (representing “Western” cultures) and Japanese as collectivistic (representing 
“Eastern” and, by extension, other “non-Western” cultures). 
Ambiguities in defining I-C 
In their reviews, Takano and Osaka (1997, 1999, 2018) have questioned the positioning of 
American and Japanese participants on the I-C dimension, but they have not questioned the utility of 
I-C as a dimension for comparing cultural groups or their individual members. Takano and Osaka 
(2018) strongly defend the concept of I-C, describing it as a “ready-made concept” comparable to 
the concept of “length” in measurement. In my view, however, it is important to grapple with 
important conceptual ambiguities and inconsistencies in the I-C construct, as it has been used by 
different researchers—and even by the same researchers over time. Because they do not do so, 
Takano and Osaka’s conclusions apply to their own definition of I-C, but they may not necessarily 
apply to alternative conceptualizations of I-C. Two areas of conceptual slippage in I-C research seem 
especially important: 
First is the level of analysis at which individualism and collectivism are located. Hofstede 
(2001) defined individualism and collectivism as forms of social organization—properties of societies 
and not individuals. He emphasized the importance of distinguishing individual and cultural levels of 
analysis: “Cultures are not king-size individuals […] and their internal logic cannot be understood in 
the terms used for the personality dynamics of individuals” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 17). Thus, for him, 
cultural dimensions such as I-C are context variables, rather than person variables; in this view, 
claiming that Japanese individuals are collectivistic would be not simply inaccurate but 
meaningless—a category error. Similarly, Triandis (1993) defined individualism and collectivism as 
“cultural syndromes”, rather than properties of individuals. To avoid confusion, Triandis, Chan, 
Bhawuk, Iwao, and Sinha (1995) proposed different terminology—idiocentrism and allocentrism—for 
individual differences on dimensions associated with cultural I-C. However, Triandis and Gelfand 
(1998) subsequently reverted to “individualism” and “collectivism” when naming their individual 
differences measure. These terms are now widely used to describe individuals, as well as cultures, 
and it is the characterization of US and Japanese individuals as differing on I-C that Takano and 
Osaka (1997, 1999, 2018) labelled as the “common view” and evaluated in their reviews. It remains 
possible that US and Japanese societies may differ on I-C, but that these differences are at the level 
of societal organization, rather than the personality tendencies of societal members. 
A second area of conceptual slippage involves the conceptual boundaries and underlying 
dimensionality of the I-C construct. Triandis and colleagues (1995) defined both cultural I-C and 
individual idiocentrism-allocentrism as multifaceted constructs, encompassing numerous dimensions 
of beliefs, values, self-views, norms, attitudes, and other variables that they considered to be 
“organized around a central theme” (p. 462). For their meta-analysis of I-C studies, Oyserman et al. 
(2002) identified seven “components” of individualism (independence, personal goals, competition, 
uniqueness, privacy, self-knowledge, and direct communication) and eight “components” of 
collectivism (relational self, belonging, duty, harmony, seeking advice, contextual variability, 
hierarchy, and group work). Different subsets of these 15 components were represented among the 
items of different I-C measures. Moreover, the measures varied in dimensionality: some treated I-C 
as a single bipolar construct, others measured individualism and collectivism as separate constructs, 
and a few distinguished types of individualism and types of collectivism.  
Takano and Osaka (1997, 1999) initially did not consider possible multidimensionality of I-C 
when evaluating the common view. Instead, they appealed to an “ordinary definition of I/C” (1999, 
p. 313), which they defined as a bipolar continuum, such that “Individualism gives priority to an 
individual and stresses autonomy, whereas collectivism gives priority to an in-group and stresses 
conformity” (p. 314). Takano and Osaka (2018) argue that I-C, thus defined, is a unitary dimension—
claiming that it is no more multidimensional than the concept of “length” in physics and that its 
supposed multidimensionality is limited to variation across contexts (for example, one might be 
collectivistic in relation to one’s family but individualistic in relation to one’s nation: Realo & Allik, 
1999), but not variation in content. Conceptually, however, the components of their “ordinary 
definition”—prioritizing personal vs. in-group goals, autonomy, and conformity—are separable: One 
might autonomously choose to behave similarly to others, or one might be influenced to behave 
differently from others (i.e., autonomy is not necessarily the opposite of conformity); moreover, one 
might do any of these things to serve either a personal or an in-group goal. Vignoles et al. (2016) 
found that self-construal dimensions of self-direction vs. reception to influence (i.e. high vs. low 
autonomy), difference vs. similarity (i.e. low vs. high conformity), and self-interest versus 
commitment to others (i.e. prioritizing personal vs. in-group goals) showed relatively little shared 
variance at the individual level (r’s = .214, .288, .435) and several correlations were negative at the 
cultural level (r = -.361, -.241, .464). Thus, I believe that the “ordinary definition of I/C” is not 
unidimensional. Moreover, it omits many other features that have been conceptualized and 
measured as components of I-C (Oyserman et al., 2002, as described above).  
Furthermore, Hofstede (2001) defined I-C as a dimension of cultural values and subsequent 
writers considered values as an important component of I-C (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Triandis, 1993), 
whereas Takano and Osaka (1999, 2018) bracket off studies of values in a separate part of their 
review. Similarly, many writers consider differences in self-construal to be an important facet of I-C 
(Brewer & Chen, 2007; Triandis, 1993) and measures of I-C often share many of the same items as 
measures of independent and interdependent self-construals (Oyserman et al., 2002), but Takano 
and Osaka (1999, 2018) decided to exclude studies of self-construal entirely from their review. This 
raises the possibility that conclusions about US individualism and Japanese collectivism might 
depend on how one draws the conceptual and empirical boundaries of these constructs. 
Although I understand their choice to stick to a relatively precise and narrow conceptual 
definition of I-C, I am sorry that Takano and Osaka (2018) did not also delve a little deeper into the 
potential implications of “messier” multidimensional conceptualizations. Doing so might have 
revealed a more nuanced picture of cultural similarities and differences among American and 
Japanese participants. Perhaps this might also have helped explain the heterogeneous pattern of 
findings in their review, where 14% of studies significantly supported the common view, 31% of 
studies showed significant results opposite to the common view, and 54% showed non-significant or 
mixed results. As the authors note, there were more significant results both for and in opposition to 
the common view than would be expected based on a simple null hypothesis.  
US and Japanese cultures in global context 
Toward this end, it may be interesting to explore how US and Japanese samples are positioned 
in the context of larger multinational studies of cultural values (S. H. Schwartz, 2006), models of 
selfhood (Vignoles et al., 2016), and practices (Gelfand et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 2018; Uz, 2014). 
In Schwartz’ (2006) study of cultural value priorities in 76 nations, US samples occupied a moderate 
position on the dimension of autonomy versus embeddedness (which is conceptually and empirically 
closest to I-C), and they showed a relatively strong focus on values of mastery and hierarchy over 
harmony and egalitarianism; Japanese samples showed an unusual pattern, strongly emphasizing 
harmony values as well as hierarchy over egalitarianism (suggestive of collectivism), but also 
prioritizing autonomy over embeddedness values (suggestive of individualism).  
In Vignoles and colleagues’ (2016) study of models of selfhood in 55 cultural groups, US 
samples shared a relatively strong emphasis on two forms of independence—difference (vs. 
similarity) and self-expression (vs. harmony)—but not others; meanwhile, Japanese samples scored 
very highly on two other aspects of independence—self-containment (vs. connection to others) and 
self-direction (vs. reception to influence)—but also on two aspects of interdependence—variability 
(vs. consistency) and dependence on others (vs. self-reliance).  
In studies of cultural tightness versus looseness across 33 nations (Gelfand et al., 2011) and 
among representative samples from 68 nations (Uz, 2014), Japanese samples showed somewhat 
tighter norms than US samples, but both countries were towards the middle when viewed in a wider 
global context. However, in a study of differences in relational mobility across 39 nations, Japanese 
participants reported the lowest relational mobility of all nations sampled, whereas US participants 
reported among the highest levels of relational mobility (Thomson et al., 2018).  
In their values, models of selfhood and cultural practices, US samples are not representative 
of “Western” cultures, and Japanese samples appear highly atypical of “Confucian” or “South/East 
Asian” samples—let alone the totality of “non-Western” cultures. Moreover, when viewed against a 
global backdrop, neither of these national cultures seems clearly “individualist” or “collectivist”—
participants in each nation appear individualist in some respects and collectivist in others. 
Nevertheless, when interpreted through the lens of the “cultural binary” and a rather flexible 
definition of I-C, it is not hard to see how a superficial interpreter might seize on the individualist 
aspects of US culture and the collectivist aspects of Japanese culture as evidence that US individuals 
are indeed individualistic and Japanese individuals are indeed collectivistic. 
Explaining away discrepant findings 
For a would-be defender of the “common view”, a remaining problem is how to explain away 
the many findings of Japanese individualism and American collectivism, as well as those showing no 
difference. A common explanation for these discrepancies is that they are due to “methodological 
limitations”. I recently attended a talk by a researcher describing an impressive program of cross-
cultural studies. The researcher presented results showing the predicted cross-cultural (i.e., West vs. 
East) differences on her outcome variable, as well as that the outcome variable was associated as 
expected with individual differences on an I-C measure. When asked whether she had tested if 
individualism and collectivism accounted for (i.e., mediated) the observed cross-cultural differences 
on her outcome variable, she replied that the cultural groups did not show the expected mean 
differences on the I-C measure and so a mediation analysis was impossible, but this was OK because 
“these measures never show the expected mean differences”. Her solution—like that of many I-C 
researchers—was simply not to present the group means. Thus, when the results do not match the 
theory, the results must be wrong—and the theory becomes unfalsifiable. 
In their updated review, Takano and Osaka (2018) dispel several methodological explanations 
that are often used to discount results that are inconvenient for the common view or the cultural 
binary. First, they show that their pattern of findings is not due to overreliance on student samples. 
Student samples by their nature are unrepresentative of the nations from which they are drawn. 
More seriously, students may be differentially unrepresentative in different nations—given that the 
proportion of young people continuing to higher education differs greatly across nations (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2018). Crucially, then Takano and Osaka show that the common 
view has been unsupported in studies of student, adult, and even nationally representative samples. 
Second, Takano and Osaka (2018) show that the inconvenient results are not due to response 
artifacts on self-report scales, such as acquiescent responding (Smith et al., 2016) or the reference 
group effect (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002). Members of different cultural groups are 
known to differ in communication styles—including their use of response scales on self-report 
questionnaires (Smith et al., 2016). Thus, it is important to account for response styles—especially 
acquiescent responding—when comparing self-report measures across cultures. Yet, many well-used 
measures in cross-cultural psychology include no reversed items, making it very difficult to adjust for 
the potentially confounding effects of individual or cultural response styles. Moreover, it is argued 
that people typically respond to traditional self-report measures by comparing themselves against 
an implicit frame of reference—which might be a national or local context. Thus, participants in 
different cultural environments may be rating themselves in relation to different frames of reference 
when completing self-report measures of cultural orientation, and this may dilute or even eliminate 
observed cross-cultural differences (Heine et al., 2002). Crucially, then, Takano and Osaka (2018) 
show that the failure of support for the common view is not restricted to self-report measures of 
cultural orientation, but also extends to behavioral measures—which should not be affected by 
acquiescent response styles, nor by reference group effects. 
Thus, while it might be possible to explain away discrepant findings in any individual study in 
terms of sampling limitations, response styles, or reference group effects, Takano and Osaka (2018) 
persuasively argue that such explanations are insufficient when looking across the literature. 
Nonetheless, these issues are not insuperable for individual studies, and researchers ideally should 
aim to sample widely, adjust statistically for response styles, and take steps to minimize reference 
group effects when running any cross-cultural study. 
Embracing the complexity of global cultures 
I have argued that the “common view” of US and Japanese cultures is resistant to change, 
even in the face of disconfirming evidence, for several reasons: First, it is closely tied to a binary 
implicit theory of culture, which in turn is anchored in a problematic—but deeply held—cultural 
assumption that sociality is fundamentally opposed to individuality, and an equally problematic—but 
widely adopted—division of the world’s nations into “Western” and “non-Western” categories. 
Second, the cultural binary encourages rather imprecise thinking about the definition, conceptual 
boundaries, and likely dimensionality of individualism and collectivism; this conceptual imprecision 
fosters theoretical predictions that are vague and flexible enough that the perspective is hard to 
falsify. Third, researchers often do not optimally incorporate methodological recommendations for 
cross-cultural research into their studies, which leaves room for maneuver in interpreting results 
that are unsupportive. In short, the common view is deeply embedded in contemporary social 
psychological thinking and research practices, and it is well defended.  
How, then, might we move our field beyond the common view of US and Japanese cultures, or 
even deconstruct the “cultural binary” assumption? I will propose five recommendations that might 
help our field to build more comprehensive, useful, and accurate understandings of the nature and 
distribution of global cultural variations, their antecedents and their consequences. None of these 
suggestions is new, and many researchers already follow them. Nonetheless, I believe that all five 
recommendations would benefit from more widespread attention. 
Recommendation 1: Define concepts more precisely 
My first suggestion is a plea for conceptual precision. The “common view” and the “cultural 
binary” have persisted in the literature not despite, but because of their conceptual vagueness, 
which makes them harder to falsify. To facilitate a social psychology of culture that is grounded in 
data, rather than stereotypes, we need to be clear about what we are measuring. Are individualism 
and collectivism properties of societies, of individuals, or both? If both, then what exactly do we 
mean when we attribute the same property to an individual as to a society? If I-C encompasses 
multiple dimensions of beliefs, values, practices, and so on, then exactly which dimensions are 
included, and where are the conceptual boundaries of I-C?  
Greater conceptual precision would allow for a proper evaluation of the utility of the I-C 
construct. To what extent do the theorized facets of I-C actually covary at cultural and/or individual 
levels of analysis, and what is their internal structure? In other words, does the broad construct of I-
C provide a useful summary of covariation in beliefs, values, practices, and so on, at a cultural level 
of analysis, an individual level of analysis, both, or neither? Conversely, much may be gained from a 
more fine-grained examination of cultural and individual variation on multiple dimensions of values 
(S. H. Schwartz, 2006), beliefs (Leung & Bond, 2008; Owe et al., 2013), models of selfhood (Vignoles 
et al., 2016), or practices (Gelfand et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 2018). In all of these domains, 
important dimensions of cultural variation have already been identified that are not reducible to 
individualism and collectivism, however these are defined. 
Recommendation 2: Go exploring 
Researchers will be able to construct more useful understandings about other cultures to the 
extent that they can transcend their own cultural assumptions. No individual is likely to have a 
sufficiently broad vantage point, from their personal location in cultural space, to derive a complete 
understanding of cultural differences a priori, and so engagement with diverse cultural perspectives 
and concepts is needed. Working with culturally diverse collaborators may help, but this is not a 
complete solution—especially if the collaborators have unequal status. At least as important in my 
view is (a) to engage with research literatures from diverse cultural sources, and (b) to give adequate 
priority to exploratory research when developing new theory. 
The field of indigenous psychologies (Kim & Berry, 1993; Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006) provides 
a hugely valuable resource for any researcher seeking to develop their thinking about culture and 
psychology. When, as a PhD student in the late 1990’s, I was struggling to understand how a 
distinctive identity would be possible in collectivist cultures, I found answers to my questions once I 
stopped focusing on Western writings about I-C and started exploring the writings of psychologists 
who lived in cultures that were labeled as collectivist (e.g., Gao, 1996; Ho, 1995; Kim, 1994; see 
Vignoles et al., 2000). It became apparent to me that the prevailing conceptual of “undifferentiated 
collectivism” among Western researchers (see Kim, 1994) was based on misapplying a theoretical 
conception of the collective that arose in Western social psychology (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and was quite alien to members of the East Asian cultures that it was 
being applied to (see Yuki, 2011). 
Equally crucial is a willingness to learn directly from research participants in diverse cultural 
contexts, by conducting exploratory research. Recent trends in social psychology have been towards 
an ever-narrower focus on hypothetico-deductive research, where findings are given credence to 
the extent that they were predicted in advance. Meanwhile, the term “exploratory” is sometimes 
used as a derogatory term, synonymous with “atheoretical” or even “unscientific”. Of course, 
misrepresenting exploratory research as hypothesis-testing is dishonest, and it can invalidate 
statistical tests (Kerr, 1998). However, the best solution to this is not to avoid conducting or 
reporting exploratory studies, but to describe them accurately and highlight their contribution to 
hypothesis-building rather than hypothesis-testing. As is recognized in qualitative psychology, the 
value of an exploratory study may lie especially in those new insights that the researchers did not 
expect, rather than in the extent to which it matches prior expectations (Stiles, 1993). Nonetheless, 
exploration does not have to be aimless, nor does it happen in a theoretical vacuum—exploratory 
studies can be highly structured and theoretically-guided (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2016). 
Recommendation 3: Study diverse cultural groups or contexts 
One consequence of the quasi-experimental approach to studying culture is that researchers 
often seek to maximize comparability by selecting participants who occupy a similar social position 
within their respective nations—most often university students. Within the logic of experimentation, 
this potentially makes sense, provided that “culture” is equated with “nation”. However, cultural 
diversity does not only occur between nations. There may be considerable cultural variation across 
different communities within nations, whether these are ethnic groups, regions, urban and rural 
locations, socioeconomic groups, or age groups. Thus, comparing students across pairs of nations 
may considerably limit the range of cultural variation that can be studied. Also underrepresented are 
cultural groups from parts of the world that are neither “Western” nor “Eastern”—and so cultural 
dimensions and characteristics that may be important for understanding these groups and contexts 
also are likely to be underrepresented in our theoretical arsenal. 
Focused two-culture comparisons remain valuable for some purposes, but the feasibility of 
conducting large multi-national studies has greatly improved in recent years, owing to psychology’s 
expansion in many nations as well as the greater ease of contacting both research collaborators and 
participants in distant countries via the internet. One major benefit of conducting multi-national 
studies is the possibility of multilevel analyses, allowing researchers to distinguish relationships 
occurring at individual or cultural levels of analysis. This is important because the effects of living in a 
certain kind of cultural context may be quite different from the effects of personally endorsing the 
corresponding cultural orientation (e.g., Becker et al., 2014).  
Recommendation 4: Use the available methodological guidelines 
My fourth recommendation is a portmanteau one: There is a wealth of methodological advice 
available for psychologists who want to conduct research in more than one culture (e.g., van de 
Vijver & Leung, 1997). Yet, in some quarters this advice is rarely followed, or it is used only post 
hoc—to explain away inconvenient results as likely due to methodological deficiencies. Reiterating 
all of the available advice would be beyond the scope of this commentary, but I will highlight three 
points that I view as especially important: 
First, there is much available advice on maximizing comparability of meaning across cultural 
contexts. One key point is cultural decentering (Werner & Campbell, 1970): Materials should not 
include content with cultural references or idioms that are likely to be difficult to translate into other 
languages or for participants in diverse settings to interpret. Where only two languages are involved, 
cultural decentering might be aided through a willingness to change the original language version, as 
well as the translated version, when checking translations. Where more languages are involved, 
collaborators should be consulted prior to translation, or it may be useful to do a ‘dry run’ of the 
translation process into several of the most distant languages, use this to optimize translatability of 
the original version, and then do the main translations. Main translations should be produced by a 
committee and/or be checked using an independent back-translation (Brislin, Lonner, & Thorndike, 
1973), conducted by someone who is not familiar with the original version. The back-translation 
should be checked thoroughly by a researcher who is equipped to evaluate consistency with the 
intended meaning of the original version, and who can ask the translators questions to help fine-
tune the translation where there might be scope for improvement.  
Second, it is important to account for individual and cultural differences in scale usage (e.g., 
acquiescent response styles) when designing measures and in statistical analyses. Although Takano 
and Osaka (1997, 1999, 2018) found that using self-report measures did not alter their main 
conclusions, it remains the case that response styles can affect not only mean scores on self-report 
measures of cultural orientation, but also the internal structure of these measures (e.g., Vignoles et 
al., 2016). Thus, more accurate results can be obtained if acquiescent responding is accounted for by 
(a) including both forward- and reverse-scored items in each measure and (b) adjusting statistically 
for response tendencies through one of the methods available (Fischer & Milfont, 2010; Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012; Welkenhuysen-Gybels, Billiet, & Cambré, 2003). 
Third, researchers should make at least some attempt to establish measurement invariance 
across the samples studied (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Milfont & Fischer, 2010). Note, however, that 
different levels of invariance are needed for different purposes (Little, Card, Slegers, & Ledford, 
2007) and that conventional cut-off criteria for model fit may not be realistic for more complex 
models, even with single samples (Kenny & McCoach, 2003; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004)—let alone 
when multiple and culturally diverse samples are involved. Thus, measurement invariance testing 
should be a pragmatic process, not necessarily expecting to achieve a perfect fit, but nonetheless 
providing an opportunity to optimize one’s measures, by selecting the best performing items across 
cultures and removing those items that clearly fail to perform comparably. 
Recommendation 5: Expand research into cultural identities and stereotypes 
Finally, if the “cultural binary” poses a risk of basing cross-cultural understanding on 
stereotypes, then one way to counteract this is to make cultural stereotyping an explicit research 
focus. This might help researchers identify when stereotypes are at play—and thus when they might 
be involved in producing research findings.  An important caveat, however, is that the involvement 
of stereotypes does not necessarily entail that a cultural difference is not real. As Takano and Osaka 
(1999) recognized, stereotypes may sometimes contain a “kernel of truth”. Moreover, in certain 
circumstances, stereotypes can become self-fulfilling prophecies—especially when people identify 
with the category to which the stereotype pertains (Vignoles, in press).  
This becomes especially important as we move into an age of globalization—characterized by 
increasing intercultural contact. Self-categorization theory suggests that people become more aware 
of group identities when they find themselves in an intergroup situation (Turner et al., 1987). By 
implication, globalization may therefore transform cultures—in the sense of taken-for-granted 
patterns of beliefs, values, and practices—into cultural identities—aspects of self-definition that 
individuals are motivated to enact, have recognized by others, and defend (S. J. Schwartz, Vignoles, 
Brown, & Zagefka, 2014; Vignoles, in press). An intriguing possible consequence of globalization is 
that the “common view” of Americans as individualists and Japanese as collectivists might eventually 
come true—not because it was true in the first place, but because it is thought to be true—as 
American and Japanese individuals strive to validate their cultural identities. 
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